DRUGI DOM

Hja, lepo je gledati, kako so se znebili tako opevanega Greenspana, ki je zdaj kriv za vse, prej pa je bil veliki mag libertarne srenje. Model je hengal s Friedmanom in Ayn Rand, danes pa je skorajda kužen.

Če je pri libertarcih kaj moč občudovati, je to njihova sposobnost pozabe.

“In an article published in 1963 as part of Ayn Rand’s book Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, Greenspan declared that protection of the consumer against “dishonest and unscrupulous business was the cardinal ingredient of welfare statism.”

“Regulation which is based on force and fear undermines the moral base of business dealings,” he wrote. “Protection of the consumer by regulation … is illusory.”
http://www.commondreams.org/views/041800-106.htm

btw članek je iz leta 2000 ;)

“to keep profits up” – finančne inštitucije so se zaradi zastonj denarja razvadile, zato so ob zategovanju Feda začele iskati bolj donosne naložbe (ter s tem prevzele večje tveganje), da bi zadostila pričakovanjem svojih delničarjev.
Bi bilo tako, če Fed ne bi tako zgrešil pri obrestnih merah 2002-3? Ne vemo.

Kot je napisal kronist: “gospodarji vesolja” so nategnili regulatorje.
Če bi bila regulacija boljša (ali je po vašem sploh ni bilo?), potem regulatorjev ne bi bilo moč nategniti?
So regulatorji sposobnejši od “gospodarjev vesolja”?
Kdo ima večjo motivacijo?

Glede Fannie Mae pa samo tole (attention, severe reality chech ahead):

In January 2007, as years of loose mortgage lending were about to send the nation’s housing market into devastating decline, Fannie Mae chief executive Daniel H. Mudd wrote a confidential memo to his board.
Discussing the company’s successes, Mudd said one of Fannie Mae’s achievements in 2006 was expanding its involvement in the market for subprime and other nontraditional mortgages. He called it a step “toward optimizing our business.”
A month later, Fannie Mae outlined plans to further expand its activities in the subprime market. The company recognized the already weak performance of subprime loans but predicted that they would get better in 2007, according to another Fannie Mae document.
Internal documents show that even late in the housing bubble, Fannie Mae was drawn to risky loans by a variety of temptations, including the desire to increase its market share and fulfill government quotas for the support of low-income borrowers. (!!!)
Fannie Mae aimed to benefit from subprime loans and expand the market for them — and hoped to pass much of the risk on to others, documents show. Along with subprime loans, which were typically issued to borrowers with blemished credit, the company targeted so-called Alt-A loans, which were often made with no verification of the borrower’s income.

Vir: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/18/AR2008081802111_pf.html

Toliko o nekrivdi paradržavnih inštitucij za posojanje socialno šibkim.

MatejM, nikjer nisem zapisal, da paradržavni instituciji nista delovali v subprime segmentu. Seveda sta to delali, ali bi mar stali ob strani, medtem ko se drugi mastili? Saj bi delničarji popizdili. Seveda, tudi za Freddie in Fannie velja, da je regulacija zatajila, saj sta obe instituciji bili takorekoč prisiljeni igrati deregulirano igro investicijskih bank.

Tvoj severe reality check seveda ni noben reality check, ker ne pove nič novega. Npr. kdo so bili največji subprime posojilodajalci. Tukaj je seznam:

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/story/53802.html

In sedaj še Nobelovec Krugman:

“Fannie and Freddie had nothing to do with the explosion of high-risk lending a few years ago, an explosion that dwarfed the S.& L. fiasco. In fact, Fannie and Freddie, after growing rapidly in the 1990s, largely faded from the scene during the height of the housing bubble.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/opinion/14krugman.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

Pa še en reality check, ki pokaže, ne samo, da Fannie in Freddie nista posojala denarja (tega itak ne delata), ampak da tudi nista odgovorna za eksplozijo subprime nepremičninskih obveznic:

“Between 2004 and 2006, when subprime lending was exploding, Fannie and Freddie went from holding a high of 48 percent of the subprime loans that were sold into the secondary market to holding about 24 percent, according to data from Inside Mortgage Finance, a specialty publication. One reason is that Fannie and Freddie were subject to tougher standards than many of the unregulated players in the private sector who weakened lending standards, most of whom have gone bankrupt or are now in deep trouble.

During those same explosive three years, private investment banks — not Fannie and Freddie — dominated the mortgage loans that were packaged and sold into the secondary mortgage market. In 2005 and 2006, the private sector securitized almost two thirds of all U.S. mortgages, supplanting Fannie and Freddie, according to a number of specialty publications that track this data.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/business/18subprime.html

No, kakor pravi CEO Fannie Mae, v letu 2006 in naprej si je Fannie prizadevala za večjo izpostavljenost na subprime trgu. V času, ko so se že kazali obrisi krize, je regulirana paradržavna institucija še prilivala olje na ogenj.
Do leta 2006, kot citiraš, sta Fannie in Freddie šla iz polovice (!) subprime trga na zgolj četrtino. Ob ekspanziji privatnega sektorja na tem trgu pa, kot trdi CEO Fannie, tudi niso želeli stati ob strani, zato so, socialno usmerjeni kot so, prevzemali še več tveganja. Kljub temu, da so bili menda tako ostro regulirani.

Regulacija je torej zatajila.
Glede tega se verjetno strinjava.

Pa še iz tvojega prvega vira:
Fueled by low interest rates and cheap credit, home prices between 2001 and 2007 galloped beyond anything ever seen, and that fueled demand for mortgage-backed securities, the technical term for mortgages that are sold to a company, usually an investment bank, which then pools and sells them into the secondary mortgage market.

Kot sem nekje že trdil (zgornji citat to potrjuje) je prepoceni denar tisti, ki je v začetku zakuhal to godljo. Prepoceni denar pa je v nasprotju s Friedmanovo teorijo.

Kar pa (takšen odgovor tudi pričakujem) ne zmanjšuje krivde “friedmanizma” za finančno krizo. Kriva je (menda izključno) deregulacija.